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Abstract—Traffic flows in a distributed computing network
require both transmission and processing, and can be interdicted
by removing either communication or computation resources. We
study the robustness of a distributed computing network under
the failures of communication links and computation nodes. We
define cut metrics that measure the connectivity, and show a
non-zero gap between the maximum flow and the minimum
cut. Moreover, we study a network flow interdiction problem
that minimizes the maximum flow by removing communication
and computation resources within a given budget. We develop
mathematical programs to compute the optimal interdiction, and
polynomial-time approximation algorithms that achieve near-
optimal interdiction in simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has been growing rapidly in recent years.
For example, over one millon servers have been deployed for
Amazon Web Service, which generates billions of dollars in
revenue each year and grew by over 40 percent in revenue in
2018. Cloud networks, and computing networks in general,
facilitate agile, reliable and cost effective implementations
for a variety of applications. The robustness of computing
networks is essential for web access, online database, video
streaming, among other applications deployed in the cloud.
Network flows in a computing network rely on both commu-
nication resources for transmission and computation resources
for processing. The unavailability of either type of resources
may lead to the failure to support flows. Hundreds of thousands
of websites were down due to the computation resource failure
in a data center for Amazon Web Service [1]. In 2006, Internet
services in Asia were disrupted by communication failure due
to the broken of submarine cables by earthquake [2].
The dependence of network flow on various types of re-
sources brings challenges to the reliability of a computing net-
work [3], [4], [5]. Previous research proposed new computing
network architectures to improve reliability [6], [7], [8], and
developed models to study failure cascading and protection
strategies [9], [10]. However, limited works focus on the
rigorous analysis of network flow reduction under the failures
of network resources, which is a key metric for computing
network performance and is the focus of this paper.
Flow interdiction problems have been extensively studied
based on the classical flow network model. The problem of
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minimizing the maximum flow by removing network links
within a budget is strongly NP-hard [11]. Integer linear
programs were developed to compute the optimal interdic-
tion [11]. Approximation hardness results and a 2(n − 1)-
approximation algorithm were developed in [12]. A pseudoap-
proximation algorithm was developed in [13] based on linear
programming relaxation, and another algorithm was developed
in [14] with faster combinatorial implementation. NP-hardness
result and a polynomial-time approximation scheme were
developed for network flow interdiction on planer graphs [15],
[16].
In a traditional flow network, the maximum flow between
a source-destination (s − t) pair equals the minimum cut,
which is the minimum-capacity link removals that disconnect
the s − t pair [17]. In a computing network, we show that
there is a non-zero gap between the maximum flow and the
minimum cut. The non-zero gap appears in a wide range
of network interdiction scenarios, abstracted by the shared
risk group model [18], where a single failure event may
destroy multiple network components. For example, in layered
communication networks, such as IP-over-WDM networks, the
failure of a physical link may affect multiple logical links, and
the maximum number of failure-disjoint paths could be smaller
than the minimum number of physical link failures that induce
a cut [19], [20]. In geographically correlated failure models
[21], [22], [23], one geographical failure affects multiple nodes
and links, and the minimum cut can also be greater than the
maximum flow [24]. Although seemingly unrelated, we show
that a computing network can be analyzed using a layered
graph where link failures are coupled, and thus the gap exists.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We
propose a model for a computing network to characterize
the dependence of network flow on both communication and
computation resources. The model facilitates the analysis of
computing network robustness, by integrating the modeling
of the computation resource to a classical graph model. By
extending the classical cut metric for a graph, we define cut
metrics that characterize computing network robustness under
the failures of communication and computation resources. We
prove the computation complexity, and develop integer pro-
grams and approximation algorithms to compute the minimum
cuts. Moreover, we formulate a maximum flow interdiction
problem, where the objective is to minimize the maximum
s− t flow by removing network resources within a given bud-
get. We prove the computation complexity, and develop exact
and approximation algorithms to compute optimal interdiction
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the model for a distributed computing network,
and define cut metrics to evaluate the network robustness. In
Section III, we develop algorithms to evaluate the maximum
flow and minimum cuts. In Section IV, we formulate and solve
a maximum flow interdiction problem with an interdiction
budget. Section V provides numerical results. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. MODEL
In this section, we develop a model for a distributed
computing network, and define metrics for network robustness.
A distributed computing network is modeled by a directed
graph G(V,E), where V denotes the set of forwarding and
computation nodes, and E denotes the set of communication
links. Computation nodes can process and forward pack-
ets, while forwarding nodes can only forward packets. A
computation node u ∈ V has processing capacity µu. A
communication link (u, v) ∈ E has transmission capacity µuv .
Unlike the traditional data network where flows require
minimal fixed computation tasks such as routing table lookup
and checksum, flows in the distributed computing network
can require vastly different computation resources, and hence
computation capacities at servers (as well as communication
bandwidth) are essential to process traffic. The classical ro-
bustness metric such as minimum cut is not able to capture the
robustness of such a computing network. We extend classical
flow and cut metrics to computing networks, to characterize
the need to incorporate both communication and computation
resources in network operation.
We first define computation path which supports both the
processing and the delivery of data packets in the network.
Definition 1. A computation path (P,w) from a source s to
a destination t is characterized by a sequence of connected
edges (and their end nodes) P that start at s and end at t, and
includes a computation node w ∈ P .
A network flow consists of packets that are originated
at a source, processed at one or more computation nodes,
and delivered to a destination. A flow can be decomposed
into computation paths. We illustrate an s − t flow and
computation paths decomposition using an example in Fig.
1, where computation nodes are illustrated by squares and
forwarding nodes are illustrated by circles, and the numbers
represent capacities. The maximum s − t flow is four, and
can be decomposed into one unit flow on each of the four
computation paths ({s − u1 − v1 − t}, u1), ({s − u1 − v1 −
t}, v1), ({s− u2 − v2 − t}, u2), ({s− u2 − v2 − t}, v2).
In order to reduce the flow carried by a computation path
to zero, either any communication link or the computation
resource in the path should be removed. Note that we consider
the removal of computation resources without removing the
node, i.e., the node can still forward packets without process-
ing them.
In general, there are multiple computation paths from a
source to a destination. To interdict the flow, a combination of
Fig. 1: An example of a distributed computing network.
communication and computation resources can be removed.
We next define cuts that measure the connectivity of a pair of
nodes in a computing network.
Definition 2. A communication cut for an s− t pair is a set
of communication links Ec such that the s− t flow is reduced
to zero after removing Ec.
Note that a communication cut can be different from the
classical edge cut, since a path with zero computation resource
does not need to be disconnected.
Definition 3. A computation cut for an s− t pair is a set of
computation nodes Vc such that the s − t flow is reduced to
zero after removing the computation resources at Vc.
Definition 4. A joint communication and computation cut
(abbr. joint cut) for an s − t pair is a set of communication
links Ec and computation nodes Vc such that the s− t flow is
reduced to zero after removing Ec and computation resources
at Vc.
We illustrate these cuts using the example in Fig. 1.
Edges {(u1, v1), (u2, v2)} form a communication cut, since
s and t are disconnected after removing the two links. Nodes
{u1, v1, u2, v2} form a computation cut, since no flow can
be processed after removing the computation resources at
the four computation nodes. The union of edge {(u1, v1)}
and nodes {u2, v2} is a joint cut, since the upper path is
disconnected after removing (u1, v1), and the lower path
cannot process flow after removing the computation resources
at nodes {u2, v2}.
To simplify the analysis for network robustness, we assume
that all flows have the same resource requirement, i.e., every
unit flow requires a fixed amount of communication and
computation resources. Although individual flows for different
applications may have different resource requirements (e.g.,
video streaming is communication intensive, while search is
computation intensive), the identical resource requirement of
flows can be justified by the statistical multiplexing of individ-
ual flows in a network. By normalizing units and ignoring flow
scaling, we further assume that every unit flow requires one
unit of computation resource for processing, and outputs one
unit processed flow. Under this assumption, one unit flow on a
computation path occupies one unit communication resource
at every link along the path, and one unit computation resource
at the computation node.
Before developing algorithms to evaluate the maximum flow
3and the minimum cuts, we prove the complexity of computing
the cut metrics. First, we show the hardness of evaluating the
minimum communication cut, whose proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Computing the minimum communication cut for an
s− t pair is NP-hard, if there is more than one computation
node.
Lemma 1 implies that computing the minimum joint cut
is NP-hard, since the minimum communication cut can be
viewed as a special case of the minimum joint cut when the
computation resources are abundant.
Theorem 1. Computing the minimum joint communication
and computation cut for an s − t pair is NP-hard, if there
is more than one computation node.
III. COMPUTATION OF MAX-FLOW AND MIN-CUTS
In this section, we study the computation of the maximum
flow and minimum cuts for a source-destination pair. We
develop polynomial-time algorithms to evaluate the maximum
flow and the minimum computation cut, and integer programs
to evaluate the minimum communication cut and the mini-
mum joint cut. In Section III-A, we develop mathematical
programs to evaluate the maximum flow and the minimum
cut using path-based formulation, which are intuitive but have
an exponential number of variables or constraints. In Section
III-B, we develop a layered graph representation to simplify
their computations, and develop mathematical programs of
polynomial sizes. Finally, in Section III-C, we study the gap
between the maximum flow and the minimum cuts.
A. Path-based formulations
We first develop mathematical programs to compute the
maximum flow and minimum cuts using path-based formu-
lations. While the formulations have an exponential number
of variables or constraints, they highlight the connections
between flow and cuts in a computing network to those in
a classical flow network.
We formulate a linear program to compute the maximum
flow in a computing network. Let P denote the set of
s − t paths. Let xP,w denote the amount of flow transmitted
through path P and processed at a computation node w ∈ P .
The maximum flow can be computed by the following linear
program.
max
∑
P∈P,w∈P
xP,w (1)
s.t.
∑
P∈P,w∈P :(u,v)∈P
xP,w ≤ µuv, ∀(u, v) ∈ E, (2)∑
P∈P:w∈P
xP,w ≤ µw, ∀w ∈ V, (3)
xP,w ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ P, w ∈ P .
The communication capacity constraints are guaranteed by
(2), and the computation capacity constraints are guaranteed
by (3), by restricting the total amount of flow transmitted
by a link or processed at a computation node. The objective
is to maximize the total amount of flow supported by the
computation paths.
We then develop an integer program to evaluate the mini-
mum joint communication and computation cut using the path-
based formulation. Indicator variable yuv represents whether
link (u, v) is removed. Indicator variable yw represents
whether the computation resource at node w is removed.
Constraint (5) guarantees that for each path, either one of the
link is removed, or all the computation resources are removed.
min
∑
(u,v)∈E
µuvyuv +
∑
w∈V
µwyw (4)
s.t.
∑
(u,v)∈P
yuv + yw ≥ 1, ∀P ∈ P, w ∈ P (5)
yuv ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(u, v) ∈ E
yw ∈ {0, 1}, ∀w ∈ V.
Pure communication or computation cuts can be obtained
by the above integer program with additional constraints. A
minimum communication cut can be obtained by setting yw =
0,∀w ∈ V . A minimum computation cut can be obtained by
setting yuv = 0,∀(u, v) ∈ E.
The number of paths |P| can be exponential in the size
of the network. Both the linear program (1) and the inte-
ger program (4) have exponential sizes. Compared with the
classical maximum flow and minimum cut formulations, the
main difference is that a computation path in the computing
network depends on a computation node in addition to a
sequence of connected links. The coupling of constraints by
the computation nodes brings challenges to the evaluation of
the flow and cut metrics.
B. Layered graph formulations
To address the challenges, we develop a layered graph
representation to simplify the evaluation of flow and cuts.
Based on the layered graph, in Sections III-B1 and III-B2, we
develop mathematical programs with a polynomial number of
variables and constraints to evaluate the maximum flow and
the minimum cuts, respectively.
We consider a two-layer graph, where every layer has the
same topology as the original graph. An edge connects the
two copies of each computation node across the two layers.
Unprocessed flows are transmitted thought links in the upper
layer G(V,E), while processed flows are transmitted in the
lower layer G′(V ′, E′). Flows across the two layers represent
processing at computation nodes. For example, in Fig. 2, a
flow is transmitted through (s, u), processed at u, and then
transmitted through (u, v) and (v, t). In the layered graph,
unprocessed flow is transmitted through (s, u) in the upper
layer, then transmitted through (u, u′), which represents the
processing at u, and finally transmitted through (u′, v′) and
(v′, t′) in the lower layer. Every flow from s to t and processed
at computation nodes in the original graph can be represented
by a flow from s to t′ in the layered graph. We next show
that the network resource failures that disconnect (s, t) in the
computing network can be mapped to failures that disconnect
(s, t′) in the layered graph.
4Lemma 2. Let S be an s − t cut in the computing
network. In the layered graph, removing edges S′ =
{(u, v), (u′, v′)|(u, v) ∈ S} ∪ {(w,w′)|w ∈ S} disconnects
s and t′.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that a path P
exists between s and t′ in the layered graph after removing
S′. The path P must contain a link from the upper layer to
the lower layer, denoted by (a, a′). There is a path P1 from
s to a in the upper layer, and a path P ′2 from a
′ to t′ in the
lower layer. Let P2 = {(u, v)|(u′, v′) ∈ P ′2}. Since none of
the edges P1∪P ′2 belong to cut S′, none of the edges P1∪P2
belong to cut S, under the construction of S′.
In the computing network, there is a path P1 from s to a,
and a path P2 from a to t. Moreover, the computation resource
at a is not removed, since (a, a′) remains in the layered graph.
The path (P1∪P2, a) is a computation path from s to t, which
contradicts with the fact that S is an s− t cut.
Fig. 2: Flows in the original and layered graphs.
1) Evaluation of maximum flow: Flow conservation holds
in the layered graph, since communication and computation
units are normalized and flow scalings are ignored. The
difference between a flow in the layered graph and the classical
network flow is that the sum of flows on the two copies of a
link should not exceed the transmission capacity. Let E˜ denote
the union of the set of links in the layered graph and a link
from t′ to s that has an infinite capacity. Let V˜ = V ∪ V ′
denote the set of nodes in the layered graph. Let fe denote the
amount of flow on link e in the layered graph. The maximum
flow from s to t′ can be computed using the following linear
program.
max ft′s (6)
s.t.
∑
u∈V˜ :(u,v)∈E˜
fuv −
∑
w∈V˜ :(v,w)∈E˜
fvw = 0,∀v ∈ V˜ , (7)
fww′ ≤ µw, ∀w ∈ V, (8)
fuv + fu′v′ ≤ µuv, ∀(u, v) ∈ E, (9)
fuv ≥ 0, fu′v′ ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
fww′ ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ V.
Flow conservation constraints are guaranteed by (7). Com-
putation capacity constraints are guaranteed by (8) for each
computation node. Communication capacity constraints are
guaranteed by (9) for each communication link. The linear
program has O(|E|) variables and O(|E|) constraints, which
has a significantly smaller size compared with the path-based
formulation. To conclude, the maximum flow can be computed
by the linear program in polynomial time.
2) Evaluation of minimum cuts: Recall that an s − t flow
can be interdicted by removing either communication or
computation resources, or a combination of both. We first
develop an integer program to compute the minimum joint
communication and computation cut, which can be easily
modified to compute the minimum communication cut and
the minimum computation cut. The formulation is based on
disconnecting s and t′ in the layered graph, which equivalently
reduces the s−t flow to zero in the original graph by Lemma 2.
We use different node potentials to indicate the separation
of nodes in V˜ after removing the joint communication and
computation cut. The potential of a node can be interpreted as
its distance to t′, where the edges in the cut have unit lengths
and the remaining edges have zero lengths. Let pv indicate
the potential of a node. Suppose that p(s)− p(t′) ≥ 1. There
is no path between s and t′ that only consists of zero-length
edges. Therefore, s and t′ are disconnected after removing
the edges in the cut. Let yuv indicate whether link (u, v) is
removed. Let yw indicate whether the computation resource at
node w is removed. The node potential never decreases along
a connected path, guaranteed by constraints (11), (12), and
(13) when yuv = 0 and yw = 0. Disconnected nodes may
have different potentials, guaranteed by the same constraints
when yuv = 1 or yw = 1. If all the constraints are satisfied,
s and t′ are disconnected, since the potential cannot decrease
along a connected path. The cut includes the communication
links where yuv = 1 and computation nodes where yw = 1.
Notice that if link (u, v) is removed, no flow can pass through
either (u, v) or (u′, v′). Therefore, yuv appears in both Eqs.
(11) and (12).
min
∑
(u,v)∈E
µuvyuv +
∑
w∈V
µwyw (10)
s.t. pv − pu + yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E, (11)
pv′ − pu′ + yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E, (12)
pw′ − pw + yw ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ V, (13)
ps − pt′ ≥ 1,
yuv ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
yw ∈ {0, 1}, ∀w ∈ V.
To obtain the minimum computation cut, it suffices to set
yuv = 0 for all (u, v) ∈ E, and compute the optimal solution
to the integer program. To obtain the minimum communication
cut, it suffices to set yw = 0 for all w ∈ V , and then compute
the optimal solution to the integer program.
Since it is inefficient to compute the optimal solution to an
integer program, we next develop a polynomial-time algorithm
for evaluating the minimum computation cut, and approxima-
5tion algorithms for evaluating the minimum communication
cut and the joint cut.
Minimum computation cut: Since a flow needs to be pro-
cessed by computation nodes along the paths from the source
to the destination, removing all the computation resources
along s − t paths is sufficient and necessary to reduce the
flow to zero. Such computation resources can be identified by
computing the intersection of the set of nodes reachable from
the source and the set of nodes that can reach the destination.
Both sets can be computed by depth first search. The algorithm
is summarized as follows, and has time complexity O(|E|).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for evaluating the minimum compu-
tation cut for an s− t pair
1) Compute the set of nodes Vs such that there exists at least
one path from s to every node in Vs.
2) Compute the set of nodes Vt such that there exists at least
one path from every node in Vt to t.
3) The minimum computation cut for the s−t pair is Vs∩Vt.
Minimum communication cut: If there is a single compu-
tation node u, then the minimum communication cut is the
minimum of 1) the minimum cut that disconnects s and u,
and 2) the minimum cut that disconnects u and t.
However, if there is more than one computation node, com-
puting the minimum communication cut is NP-hard (Lemma
1). Besides the integer program (10), we develop a 2-
approximation algorithm, which runs in polynomial time and
outputs a communication cut whose value is at most twice the
minimum communication cut.
Algorithm 2 Approximation algorithm for the minimum
communication cut for an s− t pair
1) Construct a layered graph. Assign an arbitrarily high cost
to every link across two layers. Assign µuv cost to each
of the links (u, v) and (u′, v′).
2) Compute a minimum cut C that separates s and t′.
3) The communication cut is given by links {(u, v)|(u, v) ∈
C or (u′, v′) ∈ C}.
Theorem 2. The communication cut obtained by Algorithm 2
has a value that is at most twice the value of the minimum
communication cut.
Proof. Let S∗ be the minimum s−t communication cut, which
has value w. By Lemma 2, in the layered graph, removing
edges S′ = {(u, v), (u′, v′)|(u, v) ∈ S∗} disconnects s and t′.
The cost of S′ in the layered graph is 2w.
The minimum communication cut C obtained by Algorithm
2 has value at most 2w, since C is the minimum s− t′ cut in
the layered graph and is no larger than S′. Note that C contains
no link across the two layers because every crossing link has
an arbitrarily high cost. Consequently, L = {(u, v)|(u, v) ∈
C or (u′, v′) ∈ C} is a communication cut in the original
graph. Furthermore, the cost of removing links L is no more
than the cost of removing C. Therefore, L has at most twice
the value of the minimum communication cut.
Minimum joint communication and computation cut: Algo-
rithm 2 can be modified to compute a joint cut whose value
is at most twice the minimum joint cut. In the first step of
Algorithm 2, instead of assigning an arbitrarily high cost to
links across two layers, µw cost is assigned to link (w,w′).
Using a similar proof to the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain
the performance of the modified algorithm.
Theorem 3. The joint communication and computation cut
obtained by the modified algorithm has a value that is at most
twice the value of the minimum joint cut.
C. Gap between max-flow and min-cuts
The classical max-flow min-cut theorem states that the
maximum amount of flow from s to t equals the value of
the minimum cut that separates s and t. In a computing net-
work, we study the connections between maximum flow and
various types of minimum cuts. Since either communication or
computation could be the bottleneck to support a flow, the gap
between the maximum flow and the minimum communication
cut or the minimum computation cut could be arbitrarily
large. For example, Fig. 3 illustrates that the gap between the
minimum communication cut and the maximum flow can grow
arbitrarily large as the communication bandwidth increases
while the computation capacity stays the same, where the num-
bers adjacent to links and nodes represent the communication
capacity and computation capacity, respectively. Similarly, Fig.
4 illustrates that the gap between the minimum computation
cut and the maximum flow can be arbitrarily large.
Fig. 3: Gap between the max flow and min communication
cut: max flow = 2, min communication cut = 10.
Fig. 4: Gap between the max flow and min computation cut:
max flow = 1, min computation cut = 20.
Since the joint communication and computation cut include
pure communication cut and pure computation cut as special
cases, the minimum joint cut is at most the smaller of the
two pure cuts. In Fig. 3, the minimum joint cut is 2, by
removing the two units computation resources, while in Fig.
4, the minimum joint cut is 1, by removing any one of the
three communication links. Note that the joint cut can be
smaller than both pure cuts. For example, consider two paths
in parallel between s and t, illustrated by Figs. 3 and 4,
respectively. The minimum joint cut is 3, while the minimum
communication cut is 11 and the minimum computation cut
is 22.
The following theorem bounds the gap between the maxi-
mum flow and the minimum joint cut.
6Theorem 4. The minimum value (cf. (10)) of the joint com-
munication and computation cut is at most twice the maximum
flow between a source-destination pair.
Proof. In the layered graph, the sum of flows on two copies
of a communication link should not exceed the capacity of
the link. By relaxing the capacity constraints, and restricting
that the flow on each copy of the link should not exceed the
capacity of the link, we obtain a modified layered graph. Since
the sum of flows in the two copies of a link is at most twice the
link capacity, the capacity constraints in the original graph are
satisfied by reducing the flow by half in the modified layered
graph. Therefore, the maximum flow in the modified layered
graph is at most twice the maximum flow in the original graph.
The minimum cut in the modified layered graph is the
same as the maximum flow in the modified layered graph.
The minimum joint cut in the original graph is at most the
minimum cut in the modified layered graph, since removing
two copies of a link incurs double cost in the modified layered
graph and a single cost in the original graph. Therefore, the
minimum joint cut in the original graph is at most twice the
maximum flow in the original graph.
The gap is shown to be tight by the example in Fig. 5. In
this computing network, each link has capacity 2. Node v is
the only computation node with processing capacity 2. The
maximum s − t flow is 1, since the flow has to traverse link
(s, t) twice in order to be first processed and then delivered
to t. Meanwhile, the minimum s− t joint cut is 2.
Fig. 5: Gap between the max flow and min joint cut: max flow
= 1, min joint cut = 2.
Unlike the classical communication network where links in
a minimum s− t cut are saturated by a maximum s− t flow, a
computing network may have links and nodes whose capacities
are not saturated but still belong to the minimum cut. We next
provide examples to support this observation.
Unsaturated node in minimum cut: Consider a computing
network represented by Fig. 5, where the processing capacity
at node v is reduced to 1.5 and the other capacities remain
the same. The maximum flow remains 1. The minimum joint
cut is node v, which has value 1.5. However, only one unit
processing capacity at v is utilized by the maximum flow, and
0.5 unit processing capacity remains idle.
Unsaturated link in minimum cut: In Fig. 6, the maximum
flow remains 1. The minimum cut is link (u, t), which has
capacity 1.5 and is not saturated by the maximum flow.
IV. FLOW INTERDICTION
In this section, we study network flow interdiction problems
in a computing network. The objective is to minimize the
Fig. 6: Link in min cut may not be saturated by max flow.
maximum s − t flow by removing communication links and
computation resources using a given budget. We first discuss
the complexity of flow interdiction problems in a computing
network, and then develop mathematical programs and ap-
proximation algorithms to compute optimal and near-optimal
interdiction strategies.
A. Flow interdiction variants and complexity
There are two major types of network flow interdiction
problems – binary interdiction and partial interdiction. For
binary interdiction, the capacity of an interdicted link or a
node is removed in full at a fixed cost. For partial interdiction,
the capacity can be removed by a fraction at a fractional cost.
We start by reviewing the complexity of network flow
interdiction problems in a communication network, based on
the classical flow network model, which imply the complexity
of interdiction problems in a computing network where the
computation resources are abundant. Suppose that the interdic-
tion cost cuv for a link (u, v) is arbitrary, and is independent
of its capacity µuv . The binary interdiction is NP-hard for a
communication network, by a reduction from the knapsack
problem [11], [15]. Moreover, the binary interdiction remains
NP-hard even if every link has one unit interdiction cost [11].
The optimal set of interdicted links belong to some minimal
cut, and the optimal partial interdiction strategy to attack a
minimal cut is greedy in the decreasing value of µuv/cuv .
Partial interdiction, on a network with unit link interdiction
cost and an integer interdiction budget, reduces to binary
interdiction, and is therefore NP-hard [15].
One special case for network interdiction is that the link
interdiction cost equals its capacity. The binary interdiction
problem remains NP-hard, by a reduction from the subset sum
problem. On the other hand, the partial interdiction problem
can be solved in polynomial time, and the optimal interdiction
is to interdict the links in any minimum cut. The maximum
flow is max{C −B, 0} after the partial interdiction, where C
is the minimum cut value and B is the interdiction budget.
The same solution can be extended to the problem where link
interdiction cost is proportional to its capacity (i.e., cuv =
αµuv , where α is identical for all links).
Since the flow interdiction problem in a computing network
includes the flow interdiction problem in a communication
network as a special case, the interdiction problem in a
computing network is NP-hard for binary interdiction, and for
partial interdiction with arbitrary costs. Nevertheless, the op-
timal partial interdiction is non-trivial even if the interdiction
cost equals capacity. The optimal interdiction may not be the
minimum cut. For example, in Fig. 6, for budget B < 1, the
7optimal strategy is to interdict link (s, u), while for budget
B > 1, the optimal strategy is to interdict link (u, t). The
maximum flow under the optimal interdiction is:
f =
 1− 0.5B, B ≤ 11.5−B, 1 < B ≤ 1.5
0, B > 1.5
We further discuss the properties of the optimal partial
interdiction when attack cost equals removed capacity. A
flow can be decomposed into computation paths. After cycle
canceling of the unprocessed flow, and the processed flow,
respectively, a flow on a computation path traverses the same
link no more than twice, at most once before processing and at
most once after processing. By removing link capacity, the rate
of flow decrease is 0, 0.5, or 1. By removing node capacity,
the rate of flow decrease is 0 or 1. The maximum flow after
the optimal partial interdiction is a piecewise linear function
in the budget.
The function is neither convex nor concave in general, as
shown by an example illustrated by Fig. 7. The maximum
flow before interdiction is 2, which is carried by computation
pathes ({s−w− t}, w) and ({s− u− v− s− u− t}, v). For
interdiction budget B ≤ 1, the optimal strategy is to attack
link (s, w). For 1 < B ≤ 2, the optimal strategy is to attack
link (s, u) in addition to (s, w). For 2 < B ≤ 2.5, the optimal
strategy is to attack link (u, t) in addition to (s, w). The rates
of max flow decrease are 1, 0.5, and 1, respectively.
Fig. 7: Example for max flow after optimal interdiction.
B. Exact solutions
We develop mathematical programs to compute the optimal
interdiction. The key is to transform the minimax problem (i.e.,
minimizing the maximum flow) to a minimization problem.
Using linear programming duality, the maximum flow is
equivalent to the minimum cut without integrality constraints.
For binary interdiction, let zuv indicate whether link (u, v) is
removed, and let zw indicate whether the computation resource
at node w is removed. Let cuv denote the cost of removing link
(u, v). Let cw denote the cost of removing the computation
resource at node w. Let B denote the interdiction budget. The
budget constraint is guaranteed by Eq. (15). The objective (14)
minimizes the maximum flow after interdiction. Informally,
µuvβuv indicates the amortized amount of flow contributed
by link (u, v), which is zero either by removing (u, v) (i.e.,
zuv = 1) or if link (u, v) is not in a cut (i.e., pv = pu
and p′v = p
′
u). Similarly, µwβw indicates the amortized flow
contributed by computation node w. The detailed derivation
of this formulation can be found in the Appendix.
min
∑
(u,v)∈E
µuvβuv +
∑
w∈V
µwβw (14)
s.t. pv − pu + βuv + zuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E
pv′ − pu′ + βuv + zuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E
− pw + pw′ + βw + zw ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ V
ps − pt′ ≥ 1,∑
(u,v)∈E
cuvzuv +
∑
w∈V
cwzw ≤ B, (15)
0 ≤ βuv ≤ 1, zuv ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
0 ≤ βw ≤ 1, zw ∈ {0, 1}, ∀w ∈ V.
We next develop a bilinear program to compute the optimal
partial interdiction. We use the same variables to represent
costs and capacities as in the integer linear program (14),
except that the variables zuv and zw now denote the fraction
of removed link and node capacities. In Eq. (18), µuv(1−zuv)
denotes the remaining transmission capacity of link (u, v), and
µw(1−zw) denotes the remaining processing capacity at node
w. The objective is the dual of the maximum flow Eq. (6)
with reduced capacities after interdiction. Although there is no
integral constraints, the bilinear program is difficult to solve
since the objective function is non-convex.
min
∑
(u,v)∈E
µuv(1− zuv)yuv +
∑
w∈V
µw(1− zw)yw
(16)
s.t. pv − pu + yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
pv′ − pu′ + yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E, (17)
− pw + pw′ + yw ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ V,
ps − pt′ ≥ 1,∑
(u,v)∈E
cuvzuv +
∑
w∈V
cwzw ≤ B,
0 ≤ yuv ≤ 1, 0 ≤ zuv ≤ 1, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
0 ≤ yw ≤ 1, 0 ≤ zw ≤ 1, ∀w ∈ V.
C. Approximation algorithms
We develop approximation algorithms based on the sensi-
tivity analysis of the linear program (6). Namely, we study
the change of the maximum flow under the changes of link
capacity µuv and node capacity µw. Our algorithms are in
8contrast with previous algorithms for classical flow interdiction
based on minimizing the min-cut [15], [11], [14]. Instead,
our algorithms directly work with the max-flow, and the
performance is not deteriorated by the non-zero gap between
max-flow and min-cut in a computing network.
We start by considering the case where the attack cost equals
the removed capacity. The shadow price associated with a
constraint in a linear program is the rate of change of the
objective for one unit change of the right-hand side value of
the constraint. Therefore, the shadow price associated with
constraint (8) is the rate of max-flow decrease for each unit
processing capacity decrease at node w ∈ V . The shadow
price associated with constraint (9) is the rate of max-flow
decrease for each unit transmission capacity decrease at link
(u, v) ∈ E. Although the shadow price is a local property
for a small change of the right-hand side of the constraint, it
gives a conservative estimate of the reduction in the max-flow
by removing the capacity of a node or a link. The reason is
that the rate of max-flow decrease is non-decreasing as the
capacity decreases, due to Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. The maximum s − t flow F ∗(µ) given by linear
program (6) is a concave function of µ, where µ is a vector
representing link and node capacities.
Proof. Let F ∗(µi) be the maximum s−t flow given a capacity
vector µi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. Let f∗(µi) denote the flow vector on
each link that support the maximum flow, given capacity µi.
Consider a capacity vector µ3 = αµ1+(1−α)µ2, where 0 ≤
α ≤ 1. The flow vector f(µ3) = αf∗(µ1) + (1− α)f∗(µ2)
is a feasible solution to the linear program (6), which supports
F (µ3) = αF ∗(µ1) + (1 − α)F ∗(µ2) flow from s to t. The
maximum flow F ∗(µ3) is at least F (µ3). Therefore, F ∗(µ)
is a concave function of µ.
We propose Algorithm 3 that greedily computes the attack
using the shadow price information in linear program (6).
Algorithm 3 Greedy binary interdiction using budget B on a
network where interdiction cost equals removed capacity
1) Solve linear program (6) and obtain shadow prices for
constraints (8) and (9).
2) Choose a link or a node whose capacity is no more than
B and is associated with a constraint that has the largest
shadow price. Denote the capacity by µ∗.
3) Update B by B − µ∗. Repeat Step 1 until B ≤ 0.
Algorithm 3 can be naturally extended to the partial inter-
diction case. In Step 2, a link or a node associated with the
constraint that has the largest shadow price is chosen. All its
capacity is removed if the remaining budget is sufficient, while
partial capacity is removed otherwise. The other steps of the
algorithm remain the same.
We then develop Algorithm 4 that computes an attack strat-
egy when the interdiction cost is arbitrary, and not necessarily
equal to the removed capacity. The algorithm can also be
extended to solve the partial interdiction problem, in the same
manner as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 4 Greedy binary interdiction using budget B on a
network with arbitrary interdiction cost
1) Solve linear program (6) and obtain shadow prices q for
constraints (8) and (9).
2) Choose a link or a node whose capacity is no more than
B and is associated with a constraint that has the largest
qiµi/ci, where µi is the capacity and ci is the interdiction
cost.
3) Update B by B − µi. Repeat Step 1 until B ≤ 0.
The drawback of Algorithm 4 is that the shadow price is
only dependent on the capacity, but not the cost. Under an
arbitrary interdiction cost, a cut may have a small capacity
(i.e., bottleneck for traffic) but a high interdiction cost, in
which case it is wise to attack a cut that has a lower interdiction
cost but may allow more traffic to go through. The shadow
prices associated with links in larger cuts are always zero,
since reducing their capacities by a small amount would not
reduce the maximum flow.
To overcome this challenge, we develop a cost-aware greedy
algorithm. The algorithm is based on the linear program (6),
where the capacities µ in the right-hand side of the constraints
are replaced by interdiction costs c. The remaining steps
are identical to Algorithm 4. The reason of using c as the
new capacities is that the linear program now serves as an
approximation of the minimum-cost cut where the integral
constraints are relaxed.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate
the applications of our proposed metrics and algorithms to
study computing network robustness. First, we study the
robustness based on the Abilene network topology in Fig. 8,
which has 11 nodes and 14 links. Since we study directed
graphs throughout the paper, we consider each edge in the
figure as bidirectional links. In the last part of the section, we
compare the accuracy and running time of the algorithms on
CenturyLink (Level 3) network in U.S., which has 170 nodes
and 230 links.
Fig. 8: Abilene network topology.
A. Max-flow and min-cuts
The maximum flow equals the minimum computation cut
between an s−t pair if computation resource is the bottleneck
to support a network flow. Suppose that each directed link
9has transmission capacity 1, and that each of nodes 6 and
11 has processing capacity 0.5. The maximum flow between
each pair of nodes is 1, which matches the value of minimum
computation cut (i.e., nodes 6 and 11).
There may be a non-zero gap between the maximum flow
and the minimum communication cut even if communication
resource is the bottleneck to support a network flow. Suppose
that each processing capacity of nodes 6 and 11 is increased
to 5. The minimum communication cut for s = 8, t = 7 is 3,
while the maximum flow is 2.5. The flow can be decomposed
as follows. One unit flow is transmitted through 8− 6− 5− 7
and processed at 6. One unit flow is transmitted through 8−9−
11− 10− 7 and processed at 11. Half unit flow is transmitted
through 8− 7− 5− 6− 8− 7 (or 8− 7− 10− 11− 9− 8− 7)
and processed at 6 (or 11). Part of the flow has to traverse link
8−7 twice, once before processing and once after processing.
In the above two examples, the minimum joint cut equals
the minimum of the pure communication cut and pure com-
putation cut. We next study an example where this no longer
holds. By setting the processing capacity of nodes 6 and 11 to
be 5 and 0.5, respectively, for s = 8, t = 7, the minimum joint
cut is 2.5, smaller than both the minimum communication cut
3 and the minimum computation cut 5.5. In this example, the
maximum s − t flow is 2.25. One feasible decomposition of
the flow is one unit flow through 8−6−5−7 and processed at
6, half unit flow through 8− 9− 11− 10− 7 and processed at
11, half unit flow through 8−9−11−10−7−5−6−8−7 and
processed at 6, and 0.25 unit flow through 8−7−5−6−8−7
and processed at 6.
B. Flow interdiction
We then study flow interdiction using randomly generated
capacities. For simplicity, the capacity of each link is indepen-
dently and uniformly chosen from (0, 1). The capacity of each
node is independently and uniformly chosen from (0, 0.1).
First, we consider the network flow interdiction problem
where the cost of interdiction equals the capacity. For s =
1, t = 2, the values of max-flow after optimal binary interdic-
tion (solving the integer-linear program), approximate binary
interdiction based on Algorithm 3, and approximate partial
interdiction based on an extension of Algorithm 3 are pre-
sented in Fig. 9. The curve for the optimal binary interdiction
is smooth, because computation resource is the bottleneck for
the flow from node 1 to node 2 and computation capacity has
finer granularity due to the small random number generation
range. We observe that the approximate binary interdiction
algorithm has good performance. Moreover, the approximate
partial interdiction algorithm gives exact solutions, since the
slope of the red curve is −1 and thus there is a unit max-
flow decrease by removing each unit capacity, which is the
maximum possible decrease.
For s = 1, t = 10, the values of max-flow after optimal
binary interdiction, approximate binary interdiction, and ap-
proximate partial interdiction are presented in Fig. 10. The
curve for optimal binary interdiction has larger steps, because
communication resource is the bottleneck for the flow from
node 1 to node 10 and the cost of removing a link is relatively
high. The steps in the curve illustrates that the interdiction
problem has the same nature as the knapsack problem where
the knapsack size represents the interdiction budget and item
sizes represent interdiction cost (i.e., link capacity). We ob-
serve that Algorithm 3 and its extension still have good
performance for both binary and partial interdictions.
Fig. 9: Cost equals capacity, s = 1, t = 2.
Fig. 10: Cost equals capacity, s = 1, t = 10.
Then, we study the performance of the interdiction algo-
rithms under arbitrary interdiction costs. The cost of removing
each link is independently and uniformly chosen from (0, 1).
The cost of removing the computation resource at each node
is independently and uniformly chosen from (0, 0.1).
For s = 1, t = 2, the values of max-flow after the opti-
mal binary interdiction, approximate binary interdiction using
Algorithm 4, and approximate partial interdiction using an
extension from Algorithm 4 are presented in Fig. 11. The curve
for optimal binary interdiction is steeper for small budgets
compared with Fig. 9, since it is possible to remove large
computation resource at small cost due to the independence
between cost and capacity. However, the performance of the
greedy algorithms deteriorates. It is worth noting that the
objective is not monotone under the greedy algorithm. The
reason is that, in the greedy algorithm, a saturated link that
has a high cost can be ruled out when the budget is small,
which allows a larger cut that has a smaller cost to be removed.
Similarly, the performance of the algorithms for s = 1, t = 10
is illustrated in Fig. 12.
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Fig. 11: Cost independent of capacity, s = 1, t = 2.
Fig. 12: Cost independent of capacity, s = 1, t = 10.
We next compare the greedy algorithm and the cost-aware
greedy algorithm on network interdiction with arbitrary cost.
We observe in Fig. 13 that the cost-aware greedy algorithm
has significantly better performance for s = 1, t = 2. This can
be explained by that a large number of computation nodes are
attacked under the optimal strategy, and minimizing the attack
cost becomes more important. However, the improvement is
not significant for s = 1, t = 10, where a small number
of links are attacked under the optimal strategy. The cost-
aware greedy algorithm rely on the interdiction cost instead
of capacity to compute the attacked links, and may attack links
whose removal does not have a significant impact on the max-
flow.
C. Scaling of the algorithms on larger network
Finally, we study the performance of the algorithms by
solving interdiction problems on the CenturyLink network
illustrated by Fig. 14. We observe that the running time of
solving the integer linear program (14) is sensitive to input
parameters. The exact solution could not be obtained within
a pre-defined time limit (e.g., 10 minutes) for some problem
instances. On the other hand, the greedy algorithms have good
performance and have much shorter running time. The detailed
results are reported below.
Each edge in Fig. 14 represents bidirectional links. The
capacity of a link is independently and uniformly chosen
Fig. 13: Comparison of greedy and cost-aware greedy algo-
rithms, cost independent of capacity, s = 1, t = 2.
Fig. 14: CenturyLink (Level 3) network topology [25].
from (0, 10). The capacity of a node is independently and
uniformly chosen from (0, 0.1). We first study the case where
the interdiction cost equals removed capacity. By randomly
choosing ten s − t pairs, and using interdiction budgets
B ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, the greedy interdiction computed by
Algorithm 3 could be obtained in 5 seconds for every instance.
The integer linear program (14) failed to output an optimal
solution within 10 minutes for two s − t pairs. Among the
instances where the optimal solutions were obtained, the run-
ning time ranged from 1 second to 4 minutes. The maximum
flow after the greedy interdiction was on average 7.7% higher
than the maximum flow after the optimal interdiction.
For arbitrary interdiction costs, we assume that the cost of
removing each link is independently and uniformly chosen
from (0, 10), and that the cost of removing the computation
resource at each node is independently and uniformly chosen
from (0, 0.1). Among ten randomly chosen s − t pairs, the
integer linear program (14) failed to output an optimal solution
within 10 minutes for nine s−t pairs. The running time of the
greedy Algorithm 4 and its cost-aware variant ranged from 1
to 40 seconds. The cost-aware greedy algorithm outperformed
the greedy algorithm in 45 out of 60 instances, and on average
achieved 26% lower maximum flow after interdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the robustness of a distributed computing net-
work where traffic flows require communication and com-
putation resources to be transmitted and processed. We de-
fined cut metrics to evaluate network robustness under the
failures of communication and computation resources. We
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developed algorithms to evaluate the max-flow and the min-
cuts, and showed a non-zero gap between them. Moreover,
we developed algorithms for flow interdiction by removing
communication and computation resources within a given
budget.
APPENDIX
A. Complexity
Proof of Lemma 1. We first prove that obtaining the minimum
s− t communication cut is NP-hard if there are two compu-
tation nodes, by a reduction from exact cover by 3-sets. The
reduction follows a similar proof in [26] that shows multicut
is NP-hard.
The exact cover by 3-sets problems is as follows. Given a
set X of 3q elements, and a collection C of 3-element subsets
of X , is there a subset K ⊆ C, such that every element in X
appears in exactly one member of K?
We construct a graph from an instance of the exact cover
by 3-sets problem. For each 3-set ci ∈ C, there is a path
s1 → ui → vi → t1 from s1 to t1. The capacities of
links (s1, ui), (ui, vi), (vi, t1) are k, 2, 1, respectively. For each
element x ∈ X , there is a path from s2 to t2. The path contains
an edge (ui, vi) if the 3-set si contains x. All the other edges
in the path from s2 to t2 have capacity k, except the edges
(ui, vi).
Finally, the source node s is connected to each of s1 and
s2 through a link of capacity k. Each of the two nodes t1 and
t2 is connected to the destination t through a link of capacity
k. The only two computation nodes are s2 and t1.
Suppose the links adjacent to s and t are not removed. In
order for a computation path to connect s and t, either s1
is connected to t1, or s2 is connected to both t1 and t2. If
there exists an exact cover K ⊆ C for X , a cut Sc can be
constructed as follows. The edge (ui, vi) is in the cut if si ∈
K. The edge (vj , t1) is in the cut if sj /∈ K. The value of the
cut Sc is 2q + (m− q) = m+ q, where m = |C|. This is the
minimum cut that separates t1 from s1, and {t1, t2} from s2,
for k ≥ 2m. Therefore, Sc is the minimum communication
cut that disconnect all computation paths from s to t.
To conclude, the minimum communication s−t cut is m+q
if and only if there exist exact cover by 3-sets for X . The
reduction can be done in polynomial time, since there are
O(q+m) edges and vertices. The computation of the minimum
communication s− t cut is NP-hard.
We illustrate the reduction using an example. Consider an
exact cover by 3-sets problem where X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},
C = {c1 = {1, 2, 3}, c2 = {1, 2, 4}, c3 = {3, 5, 6}}. In
this example, m = 3, q = 2. There exist an exact cover
K = {c2, c3} for X . The corresponding computing network is
shown by Fig. 15. The path s1 → ui → vi → t1 corresponds
to the 3-set ci, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The path s2 → u1 → v1 →
u2 → v2 → t2 corresponds to elements 1 and 2 that appear
in c1 and c2. The path s2 → u1 → v1 → u3 → v3 → t2
corresponds to element 3 that appears in c1 and c3. The path
s2 → u2 → v2 → t2 corresponds to element 4 that appears in
c2. The path s2 → u3 → v3 → t2 corresponds to elements 5
and 6 that appear in c3. The thick edges each have capacity
k. The numbers adjacent to the other edges indicate their
capacities. The red edges {(u2, v2), (u3, v3), (v1, t1)} illustrate
the minimum computation cut. The value of the minimum
computation cut is 5 = m+ q.
Fig. 15: Reduction from exact cover by 3-sets to minimum
communication cut.
B. Correctness of the integer linear program for flow inter-
diction
We prove the correctness of the integer linear program
formulation for flow interdiction. The dual of the maximum
flow (linear program (6)) is equivalent to the minimum cut
(integer program (10)) without integrality constraints. Let
zuv indicate whether link (u, v) is removed. Let zw indicate
whether the computation resource at node w is removed. The
maximum flow after removing links where zuv = 1 and
computation resources at nodes where zw = 1 is represented
by Eq. (18). The mathematical program (18) computes the
maximum flow after the optimal interdiction with budget B.
min
∑
(u,v)∈E
µuv(1− zuv)yuv +
∑
w∈V
µw(1− zw)yw
(18)
s.t. pv − pu + yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
pv′ − pu′ + yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E, (19)
pw′ − pw + yw ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ V,
ps − pt′ ≥ 1,∑
(u,v)∈E
cuvzuv +
∑
w∈V
cwzw ≤ B,
0 ≤ yuv ≤ 1, zuv ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
0 ≤ yw ≤ 1, zw ∈ {0, 1}, ∀w ∈ V.
Since zuv and zv are binary, the objective can be equiv-
alently represented by Eq. (20), by adding constraints Eqs.
(21), (22), (23), (24). To see this, note that if zuv = 0,
µuvβuv ≥ µuvyuv . In the optimal solution to the integer linear
program (20), µuvβ∗uv = µuvy
∗
uv , since µuv ≥ 0. If zuv = 1,
yuv − zuv ≤ 0, and µuvβ∗uv = 0 in the optimal solution. In
both cases, β∗uv ≤ 1. Therefore, the objective (1−zuv)yuv can
be transformed to µuvβuv . Similarly, the objective (1−zw)yw
can be transformed to µwβw. The objective Eq. (20) exactly
matches the objective Eq. (18).
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min
∑
(u,v)∈E
µuvβuv +
∑
w∈V
µwβw (20)
s.t. pv − pu + yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
pv′ − pu′ + yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
− pw + pw′ + yw ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ V,
ps − pt′ ≥ 1,∑
(u,v)∈E
cuvzuv +
∑
w∈V
cwzw ≤ B,
βuv ≥ yuv − zuv, ∀(u, v) ∈ E, (21)
βw ≥ yw − zw, ∀v ∈ V, (22)
0 ≤ βuv ≤ 1, ∀(u, v) ∈ E, (23)
0 ≤ βw ≤ 1, ∀w ∈ V, (24)
0 ≤ yuv ≤ 1, zuv ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(u, v) ∈ E,
0 ≤ yw ≤ 1, zw ∈ {0, 1}, ∀w ∈ V.
Finally, we show that the integer linear program (20) has
the same optimal solution, if the constraints (21) and (22) are
replaced by equality constraints. Suppose that in an optimal
solution, y∗uv − z∗uv ≥ 0. Then β∗uv = y∗uv − z∗uv holds in the
optimal solution. If y∗uv − z∗uv < 0, y∗uv can be increased to
z∗uv without violating any constraint and achieves the same
cost, such that β∗uv = 0. Therefore, the constraint (21) can be
replaced by an equality constraint. The same analysis holds
for replacing constraint (22) by an equality constraint. By
replacing yuv = βuv + zuv in all the constraints, we obtain
the integer linear programming formulation (14).
Remark. The network flow interdiction problem in the clas-
sical communication network was formulated as an integer
linear program in [11]. We follow a similar approach that use
linear programming duality to transform a minimax problem
to a minimization problem. The key difference is that the
classical minimum cut polytope is integral, and thus it is
possible to restrict values of pv, yuv to be binary in [11].
However, the polytope of the integer program (10) is not
integral. Thus, pv, yuv may take fractional values, which
complicates our analysis and makes it non-trivial to extend
this formulation to study partial interdiction problems.
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